Turkey, under the AK Party rule, claims to go through a fundamental change which according to the government authorities is tantamount to the emergence of «New Turkey». While there is little agreement on whether this change is for good or bad, there is little doubt that the country is going through fundamental changes. Islam appears as the central pillar of this transformation. For the pro government forces, Islam, which had been suppressed for so many decades by the authoritarian Kemalist regime in Turkey, now finally gains its deserved role in public life. For the opponents, the secular exemplary model of the Islamic World becomes more and more fundamentalist under the Islamic oriented AK Party. While Islam was targeted by the state in the previous regime, it now appears to be the central arm of the state. To the extent that the picture is clear it is misleading. This picture conceals more than it reveals.
Kemalist State and Islam
The role of Islam in the Turkish national identity construction has been more complex than it is often assumed. Nation building in the Turkish case meant building a nation from a multi religious, multi ethnic, multi linguistic plural society inherited from the Ottoman Empire. This plurality had been eliminated through exclusionary and assimilationist policies targeting people of different religious/ethnic/cultural identities. Kemalist nation building, like all other its contemporaries, was a homogenizing process guided by the motto of «one state, one nation, one language, one culture under the leadership of one man.»
Thus while there had been certain efforts of secularizing the state and society, there was a simultaneous process of persecution and expelling of the non-Muslims. It was under the CUP regime (forbearers of the Kemalists) and the Kemalist regime that Anatolia was transformed into a mono-religious society. When the republic was formed in 1923, an overwhelming majority of its citizens were Muslims and the remaining tiny non-Muslim minority were defined pejoratively by the Justice Minister of the time as «constitutional Turks» pointing to the fact that they do not really belong to the nation. Muslim identity was a prerequisite for being a member of the nation.
This emphasis on Muslim identity is all the more surprising given that the majority of the Kemalist cadres including Ataturk himself had a disdain against religion. They were motivated by a modernist/positivist bias against all forms of religion and clearly desired to eliminate the influence of religion in the society. In that, they wanted to make a radical break with the Ottoman state and society which were perceived to be motivated and guided by religious norms. Thus the new regime was shaped by a paradoxical contradiction of suppressing religion while keeping it as one of the central pillars of the national identity.
An essential strategy to overcome this paradox was the distinction made between «good Islam» and «bad Islam». The latter was represented by the historical religious organizations, brotherhoods and religious communities. These religious organizations, representatives of social Islam, were influential at the grassroots level in shaping and informally organizing the religious life. They were all severely repressed as all madrasas and dervish lounges were declared illegal. Good Islam was represented by a newly formed state institution; Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). In order to promote good Islam that is described as an enlightened version of Islam in which loyalty to the state and nation plays a central role, the secularist regime did not hesitate to use state resources and institutions. It was expected that good Islam would replace the void left through the repression of bad Islam and its institutions. Good Islam was assumed to be suitable to the national character and was described from time to time as «Turkish Islam». It was only the followers of the good Islam who appropriated the new national values (Kemalist reforms of the early republican era), whereas those that stick to the bad Islam were accused for being alien to the national culture, and being under the spell of the Arabic and Persian culture.
The creation of Diyanet was an important aspect of the Kemalist policy on religion. This was a moment of fundamental change in the history of social Islam as well since the entire clergy was suddenly transformed to state officials. In fact Islam does not have an official clergy. It was the Ottoman Empire which created the office of Seyh-ul Islam which represented the religious authority and gave this office a central role in state affairs. This did not only lead the state to be influenced by the verdicts of religion, but more so it enabled the state to control and shape the religious discourse. However, aside from this central office, social Islam had been free from both the blessing and the control of the state. Typically, a prayer leader was appointed and financed by the small community of a particular mosque. With the creation of Diyanet suddenly all mosques became state property and all prayer leaders in these mosques became state officials. Thus despite its rhetoric on secularism, Turkey has been a state in which religion and state is intertwined to the extent that all the mosques in the country and all their imams are controlled and owned by the state. This provides an excellent apparatus to state in controlling and shaping the religious discourse even at the grassroots level.
Moreover this institution enabled the state to monopolize the religious discourse. Islam like all other religions is multi-vocal and has been divided by various sects, brotherhoods and legal schools. With state monopoly over deciding on «true Islam» Kemalist regime took a step further in its nation building policy of homogenization, and tried to further homogenize the nominally Muslim society in its belief systems and practices. Particularly the Friday sermons which were prepared by the central committee of Diyanet and then distributed to thousands of mosques in the entire country were essential in the state effort to homogenize and monopolize the Muslim opinion and dissemination of good Islam.
So despite its modernist and anti-religious inclinations, the Kemalist regime couldn’t resist the temptation of instrumentalizing the influence of religion over the Turkish society through controlling religion and religious institutions. They tried this by replacing social religious organizations with state controlled religious institutions. As we will see below, desire of keeping religion under state control is a policy still in use under the AK Party regime. Diyanet continues to be functional for this policy. However, AK Party took a step further and instead of replacing social Islam with state Islam, it tried to incorporate social Islam under state control through patronage networks. But let’s first briefly look how Diyanet and its Friday sermons had been instrumentalized.
Diyanet, before and now
Typical topics of the Friday sermons in Kemalist Turkey include loyalty to the state, the virtues of committing one’s duties to the state such as military service and tax paying. At times when a particular threat is observed by the state elites, the Friday sermons would address them right away. This attempt of indoctrination might reach absurd levels. For instance at a time of economic crises in early 2000s, prayer leaders had to read in their Friday sermons that believers should keep their savings in Turkish Liras rather than in foreign exchanges. Even the religious groups could be the target of Friday sermons when the state authorities deemed it necessary. Thus in late 90s when the Islamic oriented Refah Party (the predecessor of the AK Party) was rising to power, the Friday sermons would start to point to the dangers of religious radicalism and reactionarism. While all powerful and staunchly secularist military of the country was confronting the religious oriented party in late 90s, the Friday sermons would be full of references to the sacred role of military in Turkish history and on the virtues of loving the state and its military.
However once AK Party came to power and started to control the Diyanet and the Friday sermons, the main theme that obeying the rulers was a religious virtue continued to be a major theme of the Friday sermons. AK Party didn’t resist to the temptation of instrumentalizing the Friday sermons for their political benefits. Thus particularly at times of political crises and when public opposition was mobilized, the content of the sermons would always invite the believers to obey and support their rulers. Last year, when AK Party was going to municipal elections amidst a huge corruption scandal, prayer leaders had to tell the believers in their sermons held the week before the elections that Turkey was going through turbulent times and if the people did not support their rulers then they would all suffer. Likewise, when the labor safety in the country was a hot topic following a series of tragic work accidents in which hundreds of workers lost their lives, government came under immense accusation of not caring for labor safety. This time the Friday sermons would come in help and tell the believers that human beings cannot change their fate and whatever tragic things happens one should not rebel, but suffer faithfully and patiently to the God’s verdict. In one case the sermons went to the extent that paying too much attention to safety rules and precautions would violate a believer’s faith in fate and would mean questioning the God’s verdict. Thus negligence of the safety precautions through rapid privatization and excessive desire of profit are exculpated through religious arguments on fate. This appears as a clear instrumentalization of religion in swallowing the bitter pill of neoliberal policies. However, this policy as well is in line with the secularist military’s assumption that religious feelings amongst worker class works as an impediment for the growing of class consciousness, and consequently the class conflict.
State control of islam widens
At this point it might be important to remember that as an institution Diyanet had been severely targeted by the Islamic opposition in the past. With certain insight, it was considered not as an institution of promoting religious values in the public life but as an institution that would shape and even impede the function of Islam in the public life.
However, the more party control over the state is consolidated the more it resembles its Kemalist predecessors. Religious realm had not been different in this regard. AK Party continues the policy of monopolizing and controlling the religious discourse for the benefit of its rule. However considering that Kemalists had only limited success in replacing traditional Islamic communities with Diyanet, AK Party did not try to replace the folk Islam, the religious communities and brotherhoods, with state organizations. Instead it tried to incorporate these religious civil organizations in to the state structure. Thus instead of repressing their power and influence in the society AK party wanted to make use of that power. While on the one hand AK Party continues to benefit from Diyanet and its weekly sermons for creating support for its economic and social policies, on the other hand it wants to control the grassroots Islamic communities through financial aids given to these communities. Thus the party tries to create a complete monopolization of religious discourse. This also eliminates the possibility of a major form of opposition; religiously inspired opposition.
Rent distribution capacity of the state had been particularly important in incorporating these civil religious groups to the state apparatus. In this process, many of the traditional Islamic organizations which were previously repressed for being manifestations of bad Islam developed a symbiotic relationship with the AK Party. They were economically, morally and politically supported by the government and in return provided their full scale support to AK Party.
Limits of state control on social islam
Last year, most of these religious organizations united under a platform titled the «Platform of National Will». Even the naming of the platform is problematic since it implies that those segments of the society that differ with the platform and its support to AK Party do not really belong to the nation. Moreover this attitude is not confined to the naming but both the AK Party and its supporter organizations freely accused their opponents for being un-Islamic and anti-national. This drive for monopolization, a common aspect of authoritarianism in the «old» and «new» Turkey becomes most evident if we look at AK Party’s policies towards religious groups that do not support the party policies.
The alliance formed between the former bad Muslims and AK Party does not mean that AK Party gave up the prior distinction of good Muslims and bad Muslims. Instead the party enabled the previous bad Muslims to become loyal subjects, thus be good Muslims while creating its own version of bad Islam. Thus any religious organization which for one reason or another refrains from supporting the AK Party government is severely repressed and declared as the bad Muslim. Thus during the recent feud between the AK Party government and the Gulen Movement, the most powerful religious organization in Turkey, AK Party did not hesitate to claim the group as heretic and un-Islamic (bad Islam) on the grounds that they are critical of the AK Party government. Moreover the group was accused of being controlled by the Western countries thus for being un-national and treacherous to the nation. Thus like its Kemalist predecessors, AK Party demands servitude from all religious groups in order to be defined as good Muslim. Those falling out with the party policies are declared simultaneously as anti-national and anti-Islamic.
Moreover, it would be misleading to assume that Gulen movement is the only religious group that is declared harmful. While the feud between AK Party and Gulen movement can be observed nationwide, similar cases can be observed at the micro level. Thus it became common policy for AK Party municipalities to harass religious communities in local places if that particular group did not vote for the AK Party. This went to the extent of AK Party’s Antalya municipality to shut down two Quran Schools belonging to a religious community that did not vote for the AK Party candidate in the municipal elections, for some technical excuses.
While there seems to have been a recent increase in references to religion in the public life, AK Party’s relation with religion is not confined to promoting religious values and supporting religious groups. Instead the major motive of the party’s policy on religion is dictated by a desire of controlling and monopolizing a major site of civil society.
Thus even though AK Party seems to assign religion a central place in the «New Turkey», it continues on the Kemalist trajectory of dividing Islam to good Muslims and bad Muslims. It is only the adherents of good Islam who are legitimate members of the nation. In the Kemalist rhetoric, loyalty to the state and a faith in nation was essential for being a good and enlightened Muslim. In the «New Turkey» of AK Party, Muslims are still divided as good ones and bad ones and a good Muslim is still the one that obeys the state and the rulers; but this time state is represented by the AK Party and its almost messianic leader Erdogan.